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SHORTENING THE LEASH: EMOTIONAL SUPPORT ANIMALS 
UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
Katie Basalla 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress Enacted Title VIII of The Civil Rights Act of 1968, otherwise 
known as the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”),1 to address the ongoing 
discrimination in America in the twentieth century. The FHA made it 
illegal to discriminate in renting or selling housing on the basis of race, 
color, religion, or national origin.2 While the goal of the FHA was to 
protect classes of people that were often discriminated against, persons 
with disabilities did not become a protected class until 1988 with the 
enactment of the Fair Housing Amendments (“FHAA”).3 The debates 
surrounding the adoption of the FHAA focused on maintaining a proper 
balance between protecting persons with disabilities and public safety and 
economic concerns.4 The ultimate goal of the Act was to bring attention 
to “the discrimination faced by minority populations in the United States 
in housing and housing-related transactions on the basis of race, color, 
national origin, sex, familial status, disability, and religion.”5 
For purposes of the Act, a disability includes any “physical or mental 
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major 
life activities.”6 The Act therefore covers mental disabilities, such as 
depression or Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. If an individual’s mental 
disability could be mitigated by owning an animal, a doctor may 
recommend an emotional support animal. Because these animals are 
meant to serve medical purposes and are not merely pets, they qualify 
under the “reasonable accommodations” provision of the Act.7  However, 
the boundaries of protection for emotional support animals under the Act 
are unclear, leaving many landlords and tenants uncertain of their rights. 
Many landlords may overlook or unnecessarily pry into a request for an 
accommodation they deem to be illegitimate, even if it is legitimate. 
Conversely, tenants who do not have a disability may seek an 
accommodation to bypass paying a pet deposit or fee. Both are abuses of 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2019).  
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2019).  
 3. The FHA and FHAA will be referred to collectively as the “Act.”  
 4. 134 CONG. REC. S19721(daily ed. Aug. 01, 1988) (statement of Sen.. Harkin). 
 5. H.R.J. Res. 714, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted).  
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1) (2019).  
 7. Fair Hous. of the Dakotas, Inc. v. Goldmark Prop. Mgmt., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1036 (D.N.D. 
2011). 
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the broad language of the Act and both perpetuate one another. The more 
tenants try to circumvent “no pet polices” using illegitimate means, the 
more landlords will assume accommodation requests are illegitimate.  
Courts have tried to fix this unclear standard to no avail.8 The main 
problem is that there is no uniform standard tailored to this specific 
situation. Because the FHAA is a federal act, there should be one uniform 
standard. The standards that currently exist leave too much room for 
interpretation and abuse. Additionally, the current standards try to fit 
emotional support animals within an already vague standard for other 
disability claims. There should be a uniform standard that courts 
specifically apply to emotional support animal cases. This standard 
should be laid out as an amendment to the Act.  
For an illustration of how unclear the law currently is, consider an 
apartment complex that charges $30 a month for a pet fee. Tenant A has 
anxiety. He has been seeing a licensed physician about it for the past year, 
who witnessed an improvement in the tenant’s anxiety that he attributes 
to the presence of the tenant’s dog. The physician has described this 
improvement in a document and has given it to Tenant A. Tenant B 
believes that he has anxiety, and just last week he filled out an online 
survey that confirmed his feelings and produced a document stating that 
he may benefit from having a therapy animal. He purchased this 
document for $59.99. Tenant C does not believe he has anxiety. However, 
he does not want to pay the apartment’s pet fee. He also fills out an online 
survey, but lies and checks the boxes he thinks will indicate he has 
anxiety. He purchases the document that states that he may benefit from 
having a therapy animal. All three tenants submit their documents to the 
landlord and ask to have the pet fee waived.  
It may seem obvious that Tenant A is entitled to a fee waiver, Tenant 
C is not, and Tenant B may be if the landlord receives more information. 
However, this is not how current interpretations of the Act treat this 
situation. Current law looks at the presence of a disability and whether the 
landlord knew of that disability. While this may be an effective means for 
determining whether a landlord violates the Act as it relates to physical 
disabilities, it becomes more complicated when applying the Act to 
mental disabilities. How much information must a tenant give a landlord 
to inform him that he has a disability? May the landlord ask personal 
questions about the tenant’s disability? Must he accept the documentation 
at face value? At what level does the landlord know or reasonably know 
that the tenant has a disability? Does the letter suffice for reaching this 
standard? None of these questions are answered by current applications 
 
 8. See Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, 248 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2001); DuBois v. Ass'n 
of Apartment Owners , 453 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2006).  
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of the Act.  
Therefore, the Act should be amended to provide a clearer standard on 
this issue. This new standard should require tenants to provide legitimate 
documentation of an animal’s certification as an emotional support 
animal before a landlord can be expected to make reasonable 
accommodations. Much like a prescription, this certification must be from 
a tenant’s personal doctor, but need not give details of the disability that 
the tenant may wish to keep private. The doctor must be retained for a 
purpose other than merely producing a document linking the tenant’s 
disability to an emotional support animal.  
This Comment argues that the current standards for applying the Act 
to emotional support animal cases are vague, and these vague standards 
subsequently hurt both landlords and tenants. The vagueness of the law 
leads to abuses of rights and, in many cases, unnecessary litigation. Part 
II of this Comment discusses how emotional support animals fit into the 
Act’s framework under the reasonable accommodations provision. It also 
discusses how vague standards have been adopted by various courts and 
state legislatures. Part III argues that a reworked, uniform standard will 
achieve the intent of the Act for both landlords and tenants. Finally, Part 
IV argues that requiring tenants to present a prescription-like document 
with their accommodation request will clarify the law in this area.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Congress enacted the FHA with the goal of providing “fair housing 
throughout the United States.”9 Part II(A) discusses how the FHAA 
expanded this goal to encompass persons with disabilities. Part II(B) 
discusses how emotional support animals can potentially serve this goal 
under the Act, and thus may require reasonable accommodations. Part 
II(C) discusses how courts have interpreted the Act in the context of 
emotional support animals. Specifically, this part discusses the conflicting 
standards set forth in Keys Youth Services, Inc. v. City of Olathe10 and 
DuBois v. Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua11 and how 
these inconsistent adoptions have created more uncertainty. Part II(D) 
discusses current state laws and proposals on this topic from Indiana, 
Utah, Florida, and Michigan, and how they comport with federal law.  
A. The FHAA—Expanding the Goals of the FHA 
As originally enacted in 1968, the FHA did not provide protection to 
 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2019).  
 10. 248 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2001).  
 11. 453 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2006).  
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persons with disabilities. It was not until Congress enacted the FHAA in 
1988 that coverage was extended to persons with disabilities. 
Representative Harkin, a proponent of the FHAA, sought to realize the 
FHA’s purported goals by extending protection to persons with 
disabilities, a group that was often discriminated against in the housing 
context.12  
Although many legislators wanted to extend the FHA’s coverage, 
others hesitated due to the practical implications of the proposed 
amendment. Some were concerned with the economic and safety 
implications of the FHAA.13 Congressman Henry Hyde addressed this 
hesitation by explaining that Congress needed to give “thoughtful and 
wide-ranging consideration to the needs of the handicapped person, 
balanced against the realities of public safety, economics and 
commonsense.”14 The FHAA eventually became law on September 13, 
1988, and successfully added persons with disabilities to the list of 
persons covered under the Act.   
B. Emotional Support Animals and Reasonable Accommodations 
When asserting a claim of discrimination on the basis of disability, the 
relevant portion of the Act is 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (“§ 3604”). § 3604 states 
that property owners and landlords may not discriminate against tenants 
with disabilities.15 For purposes of § 3604, discrimination includes 
“refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, polices, practices, 
or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such 
person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”16 Therefore, the 
language does not automatically require landlords to make reasonable 
accommodations for tenants with disabilities and emotional support 
animals. Rather, landlords are only required to make reasonable 
accommodations when the animal may be necessary to afford the tenant 
equal opportunity to use and enjoy the housing. It is neither clear exactly 
what this language means, nor what § 3604 requires of the landlord.  
Emotional support animals do not have the same legal protections as 
service animals. Service animals are protected under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”).17 The main differences between service 
 
 12. 134 CONG. REC. S19719 (daily ed. Aug. 01, 1988) (statement of Sen. Harkin).  
 13. See 134 CONG. REC. S19880(daily ed. Aug. 02, 1988) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). “This 
bill will make housing, whether it is rental housing, housing for sale, more expensive.” Id.  
 14. 134 CONG. REC. S19727 (daily ed. Aug. 01, 1988) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (quoting Rep. 
Hyde). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (2019).  
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(b) (2019).  
 17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2019).  
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animals and emotional support animals are that service animals must be 
specially trained and that only limited types of animals qualify.18 
Therefore, emotional support animals, comfort animals, and therapy 
animals are not service animals under the ADA.19 Conversely, the Act 
covers “all types of assistance animals, regardless of training.”20 With 
very few requirements regarding the type and training of animals, the Act 
is broader in scope than the ADA. Rather than asking what is allowed, the 
Act instead asks when these animals are allowed. 
 Simply put, the Act requires landlords to provide reasonable 
accommodations21 for persons with disabilities when the accommodation 
may be necessary to afford such persons equal opportunity to use and 
enjoy a dwelling. The analysis focuses on both the existence of a disability 
and the nexus between that disability and the reasonable accommodation. 
Recent studies on the therapeutic benefits of animals have demonstrated 
an animal’s impact on a person suffering from an ongoing mental health 
condition, showing positive, negative, and neutral results.22 For purposes 
of this Comment, it will be accepted that the use of emotional support 
animals provides positive therapeutic benefits, and thus may afford 
persons with mental disabilities equal opportunity to use and enjoy their 
homes. The crux of the question then turns on when landlords should be 
aware that a tenant is in need of a reasonable accommodation for an 
emotional support animal; that is, when has a tenant made the landlord 
aware he has a disability, under the meaning of the Act, for which an 
emotional support animal would specifically aid? 
 
 18. Jacquie Brennan et al., Service Animals and Emotional Support Animals, Where are they 
allowed and under what conditions?, ADA NAT’L NETWORK (2014), 
https://adata.org/publication/service-animals-booklet [https://perma.cc/G99Y-
693B].  
 19. Id.  
 20. Fair Hous. of the Dakotas, Inc. v. Goldmark Prop. Mgmt., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1036 (D.N.D. 
2011).  
 21. What constitutes as a reasonable accommodation is a separate area for analysis. In many of 
these emotional support animal cases, the tenants are seeking waiver of a no-pet rule or a pet deposit/fee. 
See Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 428-29 (7th Cir. 1995).  
 22. Helen Louise Brooks et al., The Power of Support from Companion Animals for People Living 
with Mental Health Problems: a Systematic Review and Narrative Synthesis of the Evidence, BMC 
PSYCHIATRY, BIOMED CENT., (Feb. 5, 2018), www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5800290 
[https://perma.cc/3C4G-VXH9]. Experiment showing the “Quantitative evidence relating to the benefits 
of pet ownership was mixed with included studies demonstrating positive, negative and neutral impacts 
of pet ownership. Qualitative studies illuminated the intensiveness of connectivity people with companion 
animals reported, and the multi-faceted ways in which pets contributed to the work associated with 
managing a mental health condition, particularly in times of crisis. The negative aspects of pet ownership 
were also highlighted, including the practical and emotional burden of pet ownership and the 
psychological impact that losing a pet has.” Id. 
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C. Courts’ Current Interpretations 
Courts have struggled to define a clear standard for when landlords are 
required to provide reasonable accommodations for emotional support 
animals. Some courts have held that a landlord cannot be liable for 
refusing to grant a reasonable and necessary accommodation if the 
landlord “never knew the accommodation was in fact necessary.”23 Other 
courts have held that a landlord “must know or reasonably be expected to 
know of the existence of both the handicap and the necessity of the 
accommodation.”24  
Many federal circuits have adopted the standard set forth by the Ninth 
Circuit in DuBois.25 In DuBois, the court held that, in order to prevail on 
a claim for a violation of the Act, the tenant must show: (1) she suffers 
from a disability within the meaning of the Act; (2) the defendant knew 
or reasonably should have known of the disability; (3) the requested 
accommodation may be necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use 
the home; (4) the accommodation is reasonable; and (5) the defendant did 
not make the accommodation.26 In DuBois, the tenants sought to keep 
their dog in their apartment as an emotional support animal, even though 
the apartment association’s bylaws stated that no animals should be kept 
on the premises.27 One tenant submitted letters from his doctor stating that 
he would benefit from animal-assisted therapy.28 The association granted 
temporary permission to keep the animal, pending review of submissions 
concerning the condition.29 The tenants filed suit against the association 
for refusing to keep the dog as a reasonable accommodation under the 
Act.30 The court held that since the apartment association never denied 
the requested accommodation, there was no violation of the Act.31 
Other courts have followed the more strict standard set forth by the 
Tenth Circuit in Keys.32 In Keys, the plaintiff applied for a zoning permit 
to establish a group home for ten troubled adolescent males, which was 
denied.33 The plaintiff argued that the city denied his request based on the 
 
 23. Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, 248 F.3d 1267, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 24. DuBois v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners , 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). 
 25. See, e.g., Astralis Condo. Ass'n v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 620 F.3d 62 (1st 
Cir. 2010); Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc., 759 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2014); Overlook Mut. Homes, Inc. v. 
Spencer, 415 F. App'x 617 (6th Cir. 2011).  
 26. DuBois, 453 F.3d at 1179.  
 27. Id. at 1177. 
 28. Id. at 1178.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 1179.  
 32. See, e.g., Lapid-Laurel v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 2002); Ely v. 
Mobile Hous. Bd., 605 F. App'x 846 (11th Cir. 2015).  
 33. Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, 248 F.3d 1267, 1269 (10th Cir. 2001).  
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familial status and disabilities of the potential occupants in violation of 
the Act.34 The disability claim was premised on the fact that the teens 
were “abused, neglected, or abandoned” and were part of a group that was 
labeled as “antisocial and aggressive.”35 The plaintiff argued that he must 
house no less than ten teens in order to remain in business, but he never 
presented evidence to demonstrate his economic need for the 
accommodation.36 The court held that since the city never knew the 
accommodation was in fact necessary, there was no violation of the Act.37  
Some courts use a completely different standard, or a confusing 
combination of multiple standards.38 In addition to the uncertainty created 
by the application of different standards, the standards are so vague that 
even the federal circuit courts that purport to follow the same standard 
apply them differently. For example, the Eleventh Circuit, following the 
Keys standard, held that landlords may ask for documentation that is 
sufficient for review of the request before being required to make 
reasonable accommodations.39 Even within the Eleventh Circuit, 
standards for “sufficient documentation” are inconsistently applied.40 
Meanwhile, other federal circuit courts following the Keys standard have 
not addressed the issue of documentation at all.41 
Applying these already unclear standards to emotional support animals 
creates even more confusion. Particularly, courts struggle trying to 
establish when exactly a landlord should know or is reasonably expected 
to know that a tenant has a disability that an emotional support animal 
would aid. Should a landlord have to accept any document from a licensed 
professional certifying the animal as an emotional support animal? 
Should the landlord be able to ask in-depth questions regarding the 
disability to “verify” that the animal aids the tenant in some meaningful 
way? Neither DuBois nor Keys answers these questions. There are many 
online certification services that make it easy to register a pet as an 
emotional support animal. For example, websites such as Threapypet.org 
assure users that landlords will accept its letters certifying emotional 
 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 1274.  
 36. Id. at 1275.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Courts that do not follow either standard tend to follow the following standard: “To prevail, 
one must prove that (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the FHA, (2) he requested a reasonable 
accommodation, (3) the requested accommodation was necessary to afford him an opportunity to use and 
enjoy his dwelling, and (4) the defendants refused to make the accommodation.” Bhogaita v. Altamonte 
Heights Condo. Ass'n, 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014).  
 39. Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase 1 Condo. Ass’n, Inc. 347 F. App'x 464, 468 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 40. See Sun Harbor Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Bonura, 95 So. 3d 262, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2012) (holding that documents that are insufficient to establish a disability may prevent the landlord from 
conducting a meaningful review).  
 41. See, e.g., Lapid-Laurel v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 2002).  
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support animals because of the Act.42 This blanket statement creates a 
state of confusion for both landlords and tenants alike, leaving both 
parties unsure of their rights. 
These unclear standards are not clarified by application in case law. For 
example, in Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass'n,43 a 
condominium association refused to accept an accommodation request to 
waive the association’s 25-pound dog weight limit.44 Over the course of 
six months, the association sent multiple letters to the tenant asking him 
detailed questions about his request, including “[w]hy does it require a 
dog over 25 pounds to afford you an equal opportunity to use and enjoy 
your dwelling?”45 The association also sent letters to the tenant’s doctor, 
asking further detailed questions about the tenant’s “total number of hours 
and sessions of mental health treatment” and whether his "condition [was] 
permanent or temporary.”46 The court held the association had 
constructively denied the tenant’s request and that no reasonable fact 
finder would have concluded that it was still conducting a meaningful 
review.47 The court also held that the requested information exceeded that 
which was necessary for the association to make an informed decision.48  
Similarly, in LaRosa v. River Quarry Apartments, L.L.C.,49 a tenant 
requested that his apartment complex waive the pet fee on the grounds 
that his dog was an emotional support animal.50 The parties battled over 
this request for approximately one month.51 The apartment complex sent 
him several forms to fill out, including a form to be signed by his doctor. 
They also called his doctor and asked him questions about the tenant’s 
diagnosis.52 Once the tenant provided the apartment complex with the 
signed form, the office proceeded to call the doctor to ask about it, fearing 
the signature was forged.53 Ultimately, the apartment complex agreed to 
waive the pet fee.54 Regardless, the tenant claimed that the apartment 
complex had made unreasonable restrictions on the process of approving 
 
 42. Frequently Asked Questions About ESA’s, THERAPYPET, https://therapypet.org/faq 
[https://perma.cc/ZAS5-WFC2]. “A person who is prescribed an ESA must be offered reasonable 
accommodations. There are very few exceptions to this rule. The letter also allows you to bypass breed 
and size restrictions, and not be forced to pay additional rent and/or pet security deposits.” Id.  
 43. 765 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2014).  
 44. Id. at 1281.  
 45. Id. at 1282. 
 46. Id. at 1283.  
 47. Id. at 1286. 
 48. Id. at 1287. 
 49.  No. 1:18-cv-00384-BLW, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35315 (D. Idaho Mar. 4, 2019). 
 50. Id. at *2.   
 51. Id. at *2-7.  
 52. Id. at *4-5.  
 53. Id. at *5-6.  
 54. Id. at *6. 
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a support animal by making “unlawful inquiries into the nature and 
severity of residents' disabilities.”55 The court disagreed, holding that 
since the dog was permitted without any fees, there was no violation of 
the Act.56 
Therefore, application in case law does not clarify the uncertainty 
surrounding the federal standards. Both Bhogaita and LaRosa focus on 
landlords seeking more information to confirm a request, but do not 
consistently illustrate at what point a landlord becomes aware or 
constructively aware of a tenant’s disability. Additionally, in both cases, 
the landlords spent extra time conducting an in-depth inquiry into the 
tenants’ request. The Act does not address whether this is required, 
permitted, or prohibited by the law.  
D. States’ Attempts to Clarify the Issue 
State legislatures have attempted to rework the stigma surrounding 
emotional support animals by enacting and proposing laws that punish 
people who falsify their need for an emotional support animal and 
heighten the standard for granting reasonable accommodations.57 The 
main issue with these state actions is that the Act is a federal law. 
Therefore, individual state standards, whether they are more or less 
forgiving of tenants’ animal requests, simply add to the confusion. Sara 
Pratt, former Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing at the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, warned state lawmakers 
to be careful about the message they were sending to landlords, who are 
at risk of receiving federal fines for violating the Act.58 Although the 
current state laws add to the confusion when trying to determine the  
federal standard, they are helpful places to look for considering a new 
standard.  
For example, Utah passed a bill in 2019 that makes it a class C 
misdemeanor to intentionally and knowingly falsely represent an animal 
as a support animal.59 The Indiana State Senate passed a bill in 2018 that 
requires tenants to produce medical documentation certifying an animal 
as an emotional support animal. This documentation may not be from a 
medical provider “whose sole service to the individual is to provide 
 
 55. Id. at *2.  
 56. Id. at *13-14.  
 57. See H.R. 43, 63d Leg., 2019 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019); S. 240, 120th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Ind. 2018); H.R. 721, 2019 Leg., 121st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2019); and S. 663, 99th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(Mich. 2017). 
 58. Farah Stockman, People are Taking Emotional Support Animals Everywhere. States are 
Cracking Down, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/us/emotional-
support-animal.html [https://perma.cc/83DY-FJBM].  
 59.  H.R. 43, 63d Leg., 2019 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019). 
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verification letter in exchange for a fee.”60 This language speaks directly 
to letters purchased from websites like Therapypet.org. Again, such 
websites assure users that purchasing a letter protects them under the 
Act—an assurance that the caselaw under the Act calls into question.61 
Under these state laws, however, a purchased letter would not be 
sufficient. The apparent conflict between the federal and state law simply 
creates more confusion. 
Utah’s standard does not clarify the issue because it is still difficult for 
a landlord to determine if a tenant is “intentionally and knowingly falsely 
represent[ing]”62 the document certifying the animal as an emotional 
support animal without further investigation. Consider again Tenant A, 
Tenant B, and Tenant C. How might the landlord prove that Tenant B is 
not “intentionally and knowingly” falsely representing, but Tenant C is? 
Indiana’s standard provides more clarity on this by requiring bona fide 
medical documentation. Tenant A would unquestionably be entitled to the 
reasonable accommodation of a pet fee waiver. Both Tenant B and Tenant 
C would not be. However, this law does not completely bar Tenant B from 
obtaining a fee waiver. Rather, it requires Tenant B to obtain a different 
form of documentation that was not simply purchased from the Internet 
for the sole purpose of obtaining an accommodation.  
Other states have proposed similar standards to both the Indiana and 
Utah bills. Florida proposed language similar to the Indiana law, but this 
proposal recently failed.63 Michigan proposed a standard that required (1) 
the tenant to provide documentation establishing the disability, (2) the 
physician to have treated the patient for at least six months, and (3) a 
nexus between the disability and the need for a support animal.64 This 
proposed legislation also failed.  
At face value, it may seem as if some of these state laws or proposals 
directly conflict with federal law and could be resolved simply by 
adopting the federal standard.65 However, because the federal law is also 
 
 60. S. 240, 120th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2018). 
 61. Frequently Asked Questions About ESA’s, THERAPYPET, https://therapypet.org/faq 
[https://perma.cc/ZAS5-WFC2]. See also WAGGY, www.waggy.pet [https://perma.cc/4Z8D-EAYG]. 
“Emotional Support Animal (ESA) letter from a licensed therapist is all you need to gain legal access to 
airline cabins and pet restricted housing without extra fees and deposits.” Id.  
 62. H.R. 43, 63d Leg., 2019 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019). 
 63. “The written documentation . . . may not be prepared by a health care practitioner whose 
exclusive service to the individual with a disability is preparation of the written document in exchange for 
a fee.” H.R. 721, 2019 Leg., 121st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2019). 
 64. S. 663, 99th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2017). 
 65. See CHARLES S. ZIMMERMAN, PHARMACEUTICAL AND MEDICAL DEVICE LITIGATION § 15A:4 
(2018). “The Supreme Court has concluded that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 
provides the basis for Congress's power to preempt state law. . . .The Supremacy Clause provides the 
constitutional authority for the proposition that conflicts between federal and state law are resolved in 
favor of federal law.” Id. 
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unclear, it is not actually that simple. Although websites like 
Therapypet.org assure users that purchasing a letter protects them under 
the Act,66 the Act itself does not guarantee this protection. It is not clear 
which standard best aligns with the intent of the Act. Ultimately, this lack 
of clarity causes uncertainty for both tenants and landlords alike.  
III. ANALYSIS 
The law governing emotional support animals should unambiguously 
inform both tenants and landlords of their respective rights. The current 
standards for prevailing on a discrimination claim under the Act are 
unclear. Applying these unclear standards to emotional support animals 
creates further ambiguity. Although some states may be heading in the 
right direction, the Act is a federal law; therefore, inconsistent state 
standards simply create more ambiguity. The goals of the Act would be 
better achieved if the Act established a uniform standard that applied 
specifically to emotional support animals. Under this uniform standard, 
tenants should be required to provide legitimate documentation of an 
animal’s certification as an emotional support animal before a landlord is 
expected to make reasonable accommodations for the animal. Much like 
a prescription, certification must be signed from a doctor who has 
personally examined the tenant for purposes other than merely providing 
a verification letter. In addition to furthering the Act’s goals, this standard 
would harmonize many current state standards with the Act.   
While certain cases suggest that internet documentation is insufficient 
to require a landlord to make reasonable accommodations for emotional 
support animals, websites such as TherapyPet.org assure users that 
internet documentation will allow for them to “bypass breed and size 
restrictions, and not be forced to pay additional rent and/or pet security 
deposits.”67 This creates many problems: a landlord may accept this letter, 
uncertain if he may be permitted to challenge it; a landlord may reject the 
letter, immediately brushing it off as illegitimate; or a landlord may ask 
the tenant invasive questions about his disability before providing the 
accommodation. To complicate matters further, when a landlord receives 
a letter from a tenant’s personal, long-time physician clearly certifying 
the animal as an emotional support animal, the landlord still many 
unnecessarily pry into the request. Determining what actions are 
permissible under the Act is far from clear. Ultimately, what is 
permissible currently depends on which jurisdiction has dominion over 
the parties.  
 
 66. Frequently Asked Questions About ESA’s, THERAPYPET, https://therapypet.org/faq 
[https://perma.cc/ZAS5-WFC2].  
 67. Id.  
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Part III of this Comment focuses on how this proposed standard would 
promote the Act’s goals. Part III(A) discusses how the proposed standard 
would afford the Act’s desired protections to tenants with disabilities who 
would benefit from an emotional support animal. Part III(B) discusses 
how the standard would restore the Act’s desired balance of disability 
protections against the economic rights of landlords. Finally, Part III(C) 
discusses how the proposed standard should be applied in emotional 
support animal cases specifically.  
A.Achieving the Act’s Goals—Rights of the Tenant 
The purpose of the Act, and the later Amendments, was to provide fair 
housing to all Americans.68 Although a narrower standard may at first 
seem like a setback for tenants, it would ultimately grant them the rights 
that the Act seeks to protect. Under current standards, tenants are 
uncertain of what they must do to put their landlords on notice about their 
disabilities. Is online certification sufficient? May the landlord be 
permitted to call the tenant’s doctor and ask personal questions? Federal 
caselaw is inconsistent on these issues.  
Under an ambiguous standard, the rights of the tenant also become 
ambiguous. As more landlords receive unfounded requests for reasonable 
accommodation, tenants suffering from mental disabilities are subjected 
to heightened review processes to ensure legitimacy. A worker for the 
Florida Apartment Association summed up this dilemma: “Obviously, 
you want to accommodate people with legitimate requests, but that’s 
harder to do when you have so many bogus requests.”69 The uncertainty 
in the law, which allows for this large volume of fraudulent requests, 
ultimately forces tenants with disabilities to shoulder the societal burden 
of this dilemma.    
While some states have taken it upon themselves to set clearer 
standards, the federal standard is still ambiguous. Under the Act, it is not 
clear how much information a tenant has to disclose before a landlord is 
on notice about a mental disability. A tenant may respond to invasive 
requests, assuming the landlord better understands the law. A tenant may 
be unduly threated with eviction and forced to move or get rid of the 
animal, without being sure if the landlord is legally correct or not.70 Even 
 
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2019). 
 69. Farah Stockman, People are Taking Emotional Support Animals Everywhere. States are 
Cracking Down, N. Y. TIMES, June 18, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/us/emotional-
support-animal.html [https://perma.cc/83DY-FJBM].  
 70. See id. Vayne Myers suffered from anxiety ever since he was young. He obtained a duck as an 
emotional support animal. He explained that the duck, Primadonna, reminded him that he matters in the 
world and immensely improved his mental state. Myers’s landlord refused to accept documents from a 
therapist that Myers video chatted with and a note from a counselor who Myers and Primadonna met with 
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if the tenant has a legal right to a reasonable accommodation for his 
emotional support animal, many times this requires a lot of unnecessary 
effort on the part of the tenant to prove. Many tenants may be unjustly 
injured due to lack of knowledge or resources and may simply succumb 
to the landlord’s demands.   
Consider Tenant A, who possesses a doctor’s note certifying A’s need 
for an emotional support animal. Under current standards, it is not clear 
if a note is enough to waive the pet fee. The landlord may ask A to produce 
more information. The landlord may outright deny the request, or may 
threaten to evict A if the animal is not removed. Tenant A, who is 
unquestionably entitled to a reasonable accommodation under the Act, 
given the intent of the Act, may simply comply with the landlord’s 
demands to avoid losing housing. Whether this is due to lack of 
knowledge of the tenant’s rights or lack of resources to challenge the 
landlord, the most significant takeaway is that the current standards allow 
for many different results. Considering the goals of the Act, Tenant A’s 
situation should result in a clear grant of reasonable accommodations. The 
fact that it does not necessarily work out this way highlights the issues 
with the current standards under the Act.  
The purpose of extending the Act to persons with disabilities was to 
afford them the opportunity to use and enjoy housing in the same manner 
as persons without disabilities. While a broad, unclear standard may allow 
for many tenants with disabilities to easily benefit from the Act, it also 
allows for many tenants without disabilities to wrongfully benefit from 
the Act. Without a clear standard for how to address this issue, tenants 
with disabilities are subjected to accommodation denials by landlords 
trying to protect against fraudulent emotional support animals requests.  
B. Reaching the Act’s Goals—Rights of the Landlord 
When coverage of the Act was expanded to persons with disabilities in 
1988, the focus was on maintaining a balance between protecting the 
rights of tenants and the realities of public safety, economics, and 
common sense.71 Current standards disrupt this balance. While in some 
cases, an unclear standard may violate a tenant’s rights, in other cases it 
may violate a landlord’s rights. The economic and safety incentives of a 
landlord are the exact economic and safety concerns at the forefront of 
 
in person. His landlord allowed cats in the building, but not ducks. He threatened eviction if Myers did 
not remove Primadonna from the building. After retaining counsel, Primadonna was permitted to remain 
in the building with Myers. Id.  
 
 71. 134CONG. REC. S19727 (daily ed. Aug. 01, 1988) (statement of Sen.. Harkin) (quoting Rep. 
Hyde). 
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the conversation when the FHAA was originally passed.72 Landlords are 
required by law to ensure the buildings they rent comply with safety 
regulations.73 They are also permitted by law to make economic gains 
from their leases, such as by charging a pet fee.74  
Consider Tenants B and C. If the landlord must accept documentation 
from both of them without asking further questions, the landlord may not 
charge the pet fee for either tenant. Over the course of one year, the 
landlord would lose out on $30 a month per tenant, which totals $720 
annually. While this economic loss is reasonable when it is necessary to 
afford a person with a mental disability fair housing, the purpose of the 
Act was not to deny landlords the right to regulate and gain economic 
incentives.  
Current news coverage on the topic focuses on the burden fraudulent 
emotional support animals place on landlords. Some recent news 
headlines include: Lying to landlords about emotional supporting animals 
would be a crime under Michigan House bills,75 Florida bill combating 
abuse of pets as emotional support animals,76 and New plan aims to curb 
phony emotional support animals in Michigan.77 Again, the means of 
fixing the problem are focused on enacting state laws. While these state 
laws seem to protect landlords’ rights and further the goal of the Act, they 
simply create more confusion. Ultimately, attempting to fix the problem 
in state legislatures may actually subject landlords to heavy fines under 
federal law.78  
Therefore, to reach the goal of inclusive housing, the Act should 
provide clear guidelines for both tenants and landlords to abide by. Once 
a tenant produces a document certifying the he or she has visited a doctor 
 
 72. Id.  
 73. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (LexisNexis 2020). “Landlord obligations. (1) Comply 
with the requirements of all applicable building, housing, health, and safety codes that materially affect 
health and safety.” (Emphasis added).  
 74. State law on this topic varies. For example, California has rent control laws that prohibit 
landlords from charging over a certain amount as a deposit. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1950.5(c) (Deering 
2020). 
 75. Lauren Gibbons, Lying to landlords about emotional support animals would be a crime under 
Michigan House bills, MLIVE (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/public-interest/2019/10/lying-to-
landlords-about-emotional-support-animals-would-be-a-crime-under-michigan-house-bills.html  
[https://perma.cc/VZ6M-DBQR].  
 76. Forrest Saunders, Florida bill combating abuse of pets as emotional support animals makes 
headway, ABC ACTION NEWS (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.abcactionnews.com/news/state/florida-bill-
combating-abuse-of-pets-as-emotional-support-animals-makes-headway [https://perma.cc/2X4B-
QY4U]. 
 77. Mikenzie Frost, New plan aims to curb phony emotional support animals in Michigan, 
UPNORTHLIVE (Oct. 23, 2019), https://upnorthlive.com/news/local/new-plan-aims-to-curb-phony-
emotional-support-animals-in-michigan-10-23-2019  [https://perma.cc/K9RS-URW9].  
78 Even if a landlord is complying with state fair housing laws, the same action may violate the federal 
fair housing laws, which may subject the landlord to fines. See Zimmerman, supra note 65.  
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who confirmed that the tenant has a disability that would be aided by an 
emotional support animal, the landlord must accept that request. A 
landlord should be permitted to verify the legitimacy of a document. 
However, landlords should not be allowed to ask further detailed 
questions about an underlying disability.    
C. Uniform Federal Standard Specific for Emotional Support Animals 
By applying a standard that is specific to emotional support animals, 
courts would resolve much of the Act’s ambiguity regarding emotional 
support animals. Currently, to prevail on a discrimination claim, in most 
states, a tenant must show: (1) she suffers from a disability under the 
meaning of the Act; (2) the landlord knew or reasonably should have 
known of the disability; (3) the requested accommodation may be 
necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use the home; (4) the 
accommodation is reasonable; and (5) the landlord did not make the 
accommodation.79 For cases involving emotional support animals, the 
relevant question is whether the landlord knew or should have known of 
the tenant’s disability. 
This language has a completely different application in cases dealing 
with physical disabilities as compared to mental disabilities. Determining 
when a landlord is on notice that reasonable accommodations for a tenant 
in a wheelchair are necessary is a different analysis than determining 
when a landlord is on notice that a tenant has anxiety and would benefit 
from an emotional support animal. Although physical disabilities are not 
more deserving of accommodations than mental disabilities, physical 
disabilities may be more readily visible by a landlord and a landlord can 
grant the accommodation without as much confusion. Landlords may 
readily provide reasonable accommodations for tenants with physical 
disabilities but may require tenants with mental disabilities to go through 
more steps to verify their disability, such as producing more documents 
or calling their doctors to question their disability.  
Even with state laws such as the ones enacted in Utah80 and Indiana,81 
the purpose of the Act is still undermined by the inconsistent standards in 
different states. The only way to achieve the Act’s true purpose is to have 
a uniform federal standard that applies to all cases involving emotional 
 
 79. DuBois v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners , 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 80. It is a class C misdemeanor to intentionally and knowingly falsely represent an animal as a 
support animal. H.R. 43, 63d Leg., 2019 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019). 
 81. Tenants must produce medical documentation that certifies an animal as an emotional support 
animal, and such documentation may not be from a medical provider “whose sole service to the individual 
is to provide verification letter in exchange for a fee.” S. 240, 120th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 
2018). 
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support animals. Whether a landlord knows or should have known of a 
tenant’s mental disability is determined at the time the tenant provides the 
landlord with legitimate documentation of an animal’s certification as an 
emotional support animal. This documentation must be produced by the 
tenant’s personal doctor explaining that the tenant has a disability and 
would benefit from the animal. A landlord may call the doctor to ensure 
the doctor had physically seen the patient and that the main purpose of the 
visit was not merely to obtain the document. The landlord may not ask 
invasive questions such as the nature or extent of the tenant’s disability.  
While this standard may require more out of a tenant, like physically 
going and receiving a diagnosis of a disability, it ultimately restores the 
balance of rights the drafters of the Act sought to protect. Under this 
standard, landlords would not be able to subject tenants with mental 
disabilities to strung-out, invasive investigations. Additionally, tenants 
without disabilities, who are simply trying to circumvent paying a pet fee, 
would be less likely to abuse the Act.  
A physical examination from a doctor is best suited to protect both 
landlords’ and tenants’ rights. While online certifications may be 
convenient for those suffering from a mental disability, they are easy to 
falsify. All a user has to do is check the boxes that equate to anxiety or 
depression and then pay a fee to receive the document. While a patient 
may be able to similarly “check boxes” while physically visiting a doctor, 
doctors are better positioned to verify the legitimacy of a patient’s 
disability than an online questionnaire. The doctor can then ask follow-
up questions and conduct a thorough examination. After the examination, 
if the doctor believes the patient would truly benefit from an emotional 
support animal, the doctor may choose to give the patient the appropriate 
documentation. This diagnostic process is completely absent from online 
certifications.  
Application of this standard in both LaRosa82 and Bhogaita83 would 
have resulted in consistent outcomes. In Bhogaita, rather than spending 
six months investigating the request, the apartment association could have 
simply informed the tenant that he had to provide documentation from his 
doctor stating that he had a medical condition that an emotional support 
animal would have aided, or the request would be denied. If the tenant 
produced such documentation, the association may have authenticated it 
by confirming the doctor saw and diagnosed the tenant, but could not have 
asked either the tenant or the doctor invasive questions such as “[w]hy 
does it require a dog over 25 pounds to afford you an equal opportunity 
 
 82. LaRosa v. River Quarry Apartments, L.L.C., No. 1:18-cv-00384-BLW, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
35315 (D. Idaho Mar. 4, 2019). 
 83. Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass'n, 765 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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to use and enjoy your dwelling?”84 Although the tenant in Bhogaita 
ultimately prevailed, the process of obtaining the reasonable 
accommodations could have been easier for both parties under this 
uniform standard. This simplified standard likely could have helped both 
parties avoid litigation altogether. 
The process in LaRosa85 was closer to conforming with this 
Comment’s suggested standard. However, the process in LaRosa was still 
more drawn out than necessary. While it was appropriate for the 
apartment complex to request the tenant to produce a signed form from 
his doctor, the apartment complex also called the doctor’s office to inquire 
about the diagnosis. This was invasive and unnecessary. It should be 
doctors who assess an individual’s disability, not landlords. Under this 
new standard, the apartment complex should have waited for the tenant 
to produce the signed form before calling the doctor’s office. Upon 
receiving the form, the landlord would have been permitted to call the 
doctor’s office to ensure the form was legitimately signed by the tenant’s 
doctor.   
Consider again Tenant A, Tenant B, and Tenant C. Under this proposed 
standard, the requirements of the landlord more are clear. The landlord 
may call the signing doctor on Tenant A’s request to ensure that he is a 
licensed physician and verify the document. The landlord may not ask 
further questions about the tenant’s disability. If the doctor verifies the 
document, the landlord must waive the pet fee for Tenant A. The landlord 
may ask Tenant B and Tenant C for further documentation to ensure the 
tenants physically visited the doctor and received a diagnosis. If Tenant 
B had a personal doctor confirm that he has anxiety that will be aided by 
an emotional support animal, the landlord must also waive the pet fee for 
Tenant B. The landlord may ask the same of Tenant C, who will 
ultimately not be able to obtain that documentation because he does not 
have anxiety. The landlord may then deny Tenant C’s request.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
To restore the balance intended by the Act, emotional support animals 
should be treated like other medical remedies to mental disabilities. An 
individual who is experiencing depression cannot simply print off a 
prescription for antidepressants from the Internet. He or she must see a 
doctor in person, receive a diagnosis, and acquire a prescription. The 
standard should be no different for emotional support animals. This is not 
to say that in order for an individual to receive relief from an emotional 
 
 84. Id. at 1282. 
 85.  2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35315.  
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support animal for a mental disability, that individual must first be 
physically examined and diagnosed by a doctor. Animals can provide 
therapeutic effects to their owners regardless of official diagnosis.  
However, in order to maintain the proper balance between a tenant’s 
rights and the economic and safety rights of the landlord, this individual 
must first go through the proper steps to make the landlord aware of their 
disability and the connection of the emotional support animal to that 
disability in order to obtain reasonable accommodations.  
The current trend followed by landlords is to assume that emotional 
support animals are illegitimate. This issue is not exclusive to the housing 
context, and is also prevalent in areas such as airplanes and college 
dormitories.86 As the problem grows in more areas outside the housing 
context, it becomes increasingly important to set a clear standard that will 
help prevent abuse. Setting a clear standard in the housing context will 
create an example that will help clear up the law in other areas as well. 
While the broad language of the Act may have succeeded in providing 
fair housing to many tenants with disabilities, it has also resulted in many 
fraudulent situations. Current responses to the rise of fraudulent situations 
have overshadowed the positive impacts that the Act has had on tenants 
with mental disabilities.  
The standards governing the Act should highlight the Act’s goals and 
its positive impact on every class of people it seeks to protect, especially 
tenants with disabilities. To achieve these goals, it is necessary to take 
measures to halt the granting of fraudulent requests for emotional support 
animals and protect the legitimate requests. Therefore, in order for a 
tenant to obtain a request for accommodations for an emotional support 
animal, the tenant must provide legitimate documentation of an animal’s 
certification. Much like a prescription, certification must be from a 
tenant’s personal doctor, but need not give details of the disability that the 
tenant may wish to keep private. The doctor must be retained for a 
purpose other than merely producing a document linking the tenant’s 
disability to an emotional support animal. This standard would better 
protect both landlords and tenants and would restore the balance 




 86. For a case dealing with emotional support animals on airplanes, see Diveroli v. Am. Airlines, 
Inc., No. 19-cv-23251, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190519 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2019). For a case dealing with 
emotional support animals in college dorms, see United States v. Kent State Univ., No. 5:14CV1992, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133468 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 20, 2016).  
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